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Of Standards for Extra-Judicial Behavior
Russell R Wheeler*
THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF Two SUPREME COURT JUSTICES. By Bruce Al-

len Murphy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982. Pp. x, 473.
$18.95.
I

Bruce Allen Murphy delved into reams of manuscripts and other
sources to learn more of the policy objectives of Louis Brandeis and Felix
Frankfurter and the extrajudicial means they used to achieve those objectives. This work led to three very good law review articles, 1 which received
much less notice than they deserved. The same research effort then led to
The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of Two
Supreme Court Justices, which produced a spate of excited public commen-

tary on what the book purported to reveal and not a little criticism of Murphy's methods and results. 2
The book describes both jurists' backgrounds and the relationship between Justice Brandeis and Professor Frankfurter that helped Brandeis
serve his commitments to Wilsonian Progressivism and to Zionism while on
the Court. Murphy then recounts Justice Frankfurter's contacts with persons here and abroad in pursuit of various foreign and domestic policy
goals, and then his efforts to influence appointments to the federal bench.
In an appendix, Murphy attempts a chronological review of fluctuations in
• B.A. 1965, Augustana College (Illinois); M.A. 1968, Ph.D. 1970, University of Chicago;
Deputy Director, Division of Continuing Education and Training, Federal Judicial Center.
(The analyses and points of view in this essay should not be taken as in any way the views or
policies of the Federal Judicial Center.) - Ed.
I am grateful to Ronald Collins for assistance as I began the preparation of this essay, to
Gordon Bermant, A. Leo Levin, Helen Moriarty and Howard Whitcomb for a careful reading
of a preliminary version and for helpful suggestions and comments, and to Carolyn McGinnis
for deciphering the puzzles in successive revised drafts.
I. See Levy & Murphy, Preserving the Progressive Spirit in a Conservative Time: The Joint
Reform .Ffforts ef Justice Brandeis and Prefessor Frankfurter, 1916-1933, 78 MICH. L. REV.
1252 (1980) (examining Frankfurter's pre-New Deal collaboration with Brandeis to promote
their political views); Murphy, Elements efExtrajudicial Strategy: A Look at the Political Roles
efJustices Brandeis and Frankfurter, 69 GEO. L.J. 101 (1980) (discussing the tactics that Brandeis and Frankfurter used on the Court to influence nonjudicial public policy); Murphy, A
Supreme Court Justice as Politician: Felix Frankfurter and Federal Court Appointments, 21 AM.
J. LEGAL HlsT. 317 (1977) (recounting Frankfurter's efforts to influence appointments to the
federal bench).
2. See Cover, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, May 5, 1982. at 17; Frank, Book Review, 32
J. LEGAL EDUC. 432 (1982); Kurland, Book Review, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Apr. 12, 1982, at
10; Schlesinger, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1982, § 7, at 5, col. l; Steinberg, Book
Review, 68 A.B.A. J. 716 (1982); Woodward, Book Review, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 1982 (Book
World).

931

932

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 81:931

standards of extrajudicial behavior prior to 1916, when Brandeis joined the
Court (pp. 345-63).
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., credits The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection
with two contributions. First, he says it "makes us think hard about standards of judicial behavior." 3 In addition, Schlesinger asserts that the book
"makes us think realistically about the Court itself." 4 Perhaps Schlesinger's
assessment is too generous. If the book really does make us think hard
about judicial behavior, the hard thinking does not follow from any searching inquiry that Murphy makes. Murphy looks at those standards (pp. 6-7,
247-75, 341-44), but not in great depth. Rather the thinking the book
prompts about the Court and judicial behavior stems mainly from the mass
of factual material Murphy provides.
A
The book's source of strength - its detailed description of events also gives rise to major weaknesses: flimsy inferences and occasional factual errors. Professor Robert Cover of Yale Law School, for example, finds
a pattern of inaccuracies and, more than that, he claims that "even those
important assertions that restate evidence are the product of a selective
method which ignores all but the most damning, conspiratorial interpretations."5 Schlesinger sees the same problem, albeit with a different twist. To
him, the book is "disfigured by a host of minor errors" and Murphy "gives
Brandeis and Frankfurter too much credit for decisions that were favored
by other people and compelled by events."6
In one sense, such criticisms are not surprising, because Murphy's presentation largely lacks any overarching theme save that both Brandeis and
Frankfurter labored off the bench to promote causes important to them.
Yet the book is worth reading, not because of any overall picture it
presents, but because of its fascinating extrajudicial short stories, describing
incident after incident played out between the Harvard Law School, the
United States Supreme Court, the White House, the Congress, and assorted
other places. Such a book stimulates a natural tendency to probe for inaccuracies and for questionable interpretations.
It is not unduly charitable to say that Murphy's interpretations often are
plausible. The problem is that he presents them as conclusive when his
facts merely create an arguable case for them. A conspicuous instance of the
line between the conclusive assertion and the arguable interpretation may
be the aspect of the book that has achieved the most notoriety. Stated
baldly, Harvard Law Professor Felix Frankfurter was on a retainer to
United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis. Although Murphy
cautions that "the Harvard professor cannot be viewed solely as Brandeis'
agent" (p. 43), Frankfurter was, for all intents, Brandeis' "paid political lobbyist and lieutenant" (p. 10), "the scribe" (p. 153), "the right lieutenant" (p.
33) to do work that Brandeis, for reasons of propriety or appearance, could
3. Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 22.
4. Id at 23.
5. Cover, supra note 2, at 19.
6. Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 5, 22.
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not undertake himself. To help Frankfurter meet the expenses of fighting
bureaucratic battles and educ~ting the public, Brandeis, starting in 1916,
provided him with monetary gifts. Later, from 1926 to 1938 - the year
Frankfurter joined the Court - Brandeis gave Frankfurter an annual stipend of $3,500 (pp. 40-42).7
As Murphy concedes in an endnote, other researchers already had disclosed the existence of the payments (p. 373 n.80). Several of Frankfurter's
students, in fact, knew of the disbursements, which often funded research
projects aimed at furthering Brandeis/Frankfurter goals. 8 Nor is it news, as
Murphy recognizes, that Brandeis and Frankfurter worked closely on the
national political scene. Tugwell, for instance, referred to the team in 1934
(pp. 176, 416 n.96), and in 1946 Mason described Frankfurter as "tutor to
the new administration [who] ... in tum, sought light and guidance on
general policy as well as on specific programs from Justice Brandeis." 9
Despite these previous revelations, Murphy has, no doubt, contributed
an important piece to this historical mosaic. An endnote typical of much of
the book tells how: "This is the first exposition in print of the development
and complete extent of both the financial fund and the requests that
stemmed from it" (p. 373 n.80).
But how singular was this instance of Brandeis' extrajudicial behavior?
Murphy relies on Mason's table listing the extensive gifts that the justice
provided between 1890 and 1939 to numerous individuals and charitable
causes (pp. 41, 373 n.82). The list shows, for example, that Brandeis gave
relatives and friends over $27,000 in 1925; $177,000 in 1929; and $71,000 in
1930 - all told over half a million dollars, about a third of the nearly $1.5
million in gifts accounted for by Mason for the entire 49 years. 10
The considerable extent of these gifts leads one to wonder whether
Frankfurter, albeit Brandeis' "chief political lieutenant" (p. 170), was the
only "lieutenant." Murphy describes Mason's list of gifts as "complete" (p.
373 n.82) even though by Murphy's own account it apparently is not. 11
7. Although Frankfurter viewed "himself as an employee being compensated for services
rendered," p. 41, we are not told whether he regarded the payments as taxable income or
whether the Justice Department or Senate Judiciary Committee learned of the payments at the
time of his nomination to the Court.
8. Murphy concludes, ''.judging by the lack of knowledge evident in a personal [telephone]
interview with one of these students ha!fa century later, . • many of Frankfurter's proteges will
learn here for the first time about the true chain of inspiration to which they were responding."
P. 86 (emphasis added). The "student" was Henry Friendly. P. 386 n.49. Another student,
though - in Frankfurter's Federal Jurisdiction seminar in 1929-30 - recalled that Frankfurter "told me of the work he was doing for Justice Brandeis and the moneys he received, and
the other students in the seminar also knew of these payments." Lewis H. Weinstein, Letter to
the Editor, HARV. L. REC., Apr. 16, 1982, at 11. The exchange proves nothing save the need
for caution in making declarative statements.
9. A. MAsoN, BRANDEIS: FREE MAN'S LIFE 615 (1946).
10. Id. at 692.
II. It is doubtful that the total of almost $1.5 million includes the money that Brandeis
gave to Frankfurter, because Murphy's documentation of these gifts is evidently derived from
correspondence to which Mason did not have access. In a star note, p. 101, Murphy explains
how Mason was deprived of access to Brandeis-Frankfurter correspondence "during the thirties," but earlier he characterizes things more broadly: Mason wrote "without benefit of access
to the very revealing correspondence Brandeis maintained with . . . Frankfurter while Frankfurter was a professor at Harvard." P. 8. In any event, Mason obviously did not write about
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Was Frankfurter the only colleague who worked in response to Brandeis'
requests and who, in turn, benefited from this considerable largesse, for
himself or to support still other collaborators (pp. 84, 86)? Brandeis made
"extensive use of intermediaries" (p. 73); Murphy constantly uses "lieutenant" to describe people who worked with both Brandeis and Frankfurter.
He so describes, for but one example, Brandeis' allies in the leadership of
the Zionist Organization of America (pp., e.g., 31, 55-56, 65-66), an organization that received Brandeis' .financial support (pp. 68, 38 I n.104). It
would in no way discount the uniqueness (pp. 39, 400) of the "Brandeis/Frankfurter connection" to learn that others received some of Brandeis' .financial support with the understanding that they would pursue his
objectives. It might, though, temper Murphy's description of the relationship as "extraordinary" (p. 43) or as "so unusual . . . [in] that it was
designed to free Brandeis from the shackles of remaining nonpolitical while
on the bench ..." (p. 41). Answering the question might require manuscript searching even more prodigious than that Murphy undertook. As he
implies in describing how he came across one source, even more material
may await discovery (p. 218 n.*).

B
Murphy's inability to tell the story free of the unqualified inference coincides with his inability to tell the story free of the historiographical boast.
Boosterism pervades the book, much more than the articles. 12 Thus, references are rarely to correspondence but rather to such self-promotions as a
"newly discovered missive," "which remained hidden in Moley's unpublished papers" (p. 172) or "[n]ew evidence gleaned from various collections
of unpublished letters [that] makes it possible for the first time in print to
reconstruct the justice's efforts here" (p. 330). Throughout, Murphy reminds us that his information came from "a personal interview" (e.g. , p.
297) or "a confidential interview" (e.g. , p. 312) or "an interview for this
volume" (p. 132). In reporting Brandeis' influence on Frankfurter's unsigned New Republic articles, Murphy specifies that "until now no volume
has revealed the extent to which the true inspiration for many of these
pieces was . . . Brandeis" (p. 89). Perhaps Murphy feared that if he did not
broadcast the diligence of his efforts, scholars would not recognize what he
had discovered, and all readers would not be impressed with his hard work.
The publisher may bear some fault for this belabored tone of secrets
discovered. 13 Oxford should have redirected at least some of its resources
into the extra costs necessary to carry all notes at page bottom rather than
book's end - and in editing them. Reliable documentation is everything to
a book such as this, and the reader must have confidence that the notes
have been carefully reviewed. Yet, one note cites twenty pages of an Alan
Westin article to support the text's assertion that Brandeis, "contrary to the
prevailing understanding . . . engaged an extensive literary network,
the payments to Frankfurter, although it is possible that the sources he used to construct the
list of Brandeis's gifts included those to Frankfurter, but masked or aggregated with others.
12. See note 1 supra.
13. See, e.g., the suggestions in Kurland, supra note 2, at IO; Cover, supra note 2, at 21.
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anchored by Frankfurter, to disseminate his opinions . ." (pp. 88-89, 387
n.60). Presumably Murphy meant to cite Westin's assertion that after 1916,
"Brandeis said nothing in public about Court matters," 14 and then summarize his own reinterpretation. If that is what he meant to do, why does the
book not do it that way? The language of another note is repeated almost
word for word in the text where it is flagged (p. 105, 392 n.21). Another
note citing literature "on the disparity between Frankfurter's religion and
his desire for social status" (p. 425, n.56) is flagged at a passage in the text
that bears on that point in, at best, a highly tenuous fashion (p. 207). Since
Murphy treats the point at issue much earlier in the text (p. 34), the note's
placement may have been a remnant of a previous draft. The index is also
in occasional error: University of Virginia Law Professor G. Edward
White, for example, is not the Louisiana-born Chief Justice (pp. 20, 473).
C
All this said - even if Murphy's description of the events is flawed
factually or interpretively - he has added to our knowledge in two ways.
First, he provides a documentation of numerous activities, and he fills in so
many details as to provide a new picture of the lives of these two extraordinary individuals. Cover asserts that Schlesinger documented long ago that
Brandeis was "perhaps the dominant influence in the 'Second New
Deal.' " 15 But Schlesinger himself credits Murphy with performing "a firstclass job of research," and of "reconstruct[ing] episodes in the inner history
of the Supreme Court, of the New Deal and of World War II (Washington
sector), in new detail. ..." 16 Second, and this says something about the
nature of scholarly inquiry, Murphy has provided a framework within
which others can work. Understanding develops by interpretation and reinterpretation. An initial interpretation, even with flaws, is often the necessary
impetus for further analysis that adds even more to our knowledge.
II
What Murphy does not provide, however, is any thorough analysis of
the standards that should govern extrajudicial behavior. His work is full of
shrug-of-the-shoulder references to the separation-of-powers doctrine, with
the erroneous implication that the doctrine must apply to all the varieties of
extrajudicial behavior revealed in the book (see pp. 5, 22, and especially p.
15). In an appendix, furthermore, he attempts an analysis of how norms of
extrajudicial behavior have evolved. Nevertheless, on the strength of this
book alone, one's thinking about what is proper and improper for justices to
do extrajudicially is hardly advanced. It may well be that such advancement was not Murphy's primary goal (pp. 13-15).
I would like to pose several questions about extrajudicial behavior,
mostly by Supreme Court justices, and use some of the book's rich data to
explore how they might be answered.
14. Westin, Out of Court Commentary by United States Supreme Court Justices, 1790-1962:
Of Free Speech and Judicial Lockjaw, 62 CoLUM. L. REV. 633, 635 (1962).
15. Cover, supra note 2, at 18.
16. Schlesinger, supra note 2, at 5, 22.
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One might first ask why justices should engage in extrajudicial activities.
This phrasing is at odds with the common formulation: Why should they
avoid them? To many, the latter question is answered sufficiently by a few
descriptions of what judges have done off the bench - each followed by an
exclamation point. A little reflection, however, will suggest benefits from
several kinds of extrajudicial behavior, benefits that I summarize here and
then discuss in more detail. First, the role of judges in political society may
give them unique attributes to bring to other aspects of public policy. At a
different level, they bring the special knowledge and perspective of those
who have "been there" to debates over how our judicial institutions should
be administered and who should be judges. In addition, judges have likely
developed perspectives and some degree of political acumen before their
appointments that could be put to extrajudicial service. And, by a similar
token, an occasional extrajudicial role might maintain the breadth of a
judge's perspectives and inform the judicial mind.
To many, these statements do nothing but illuminate the threats that
extrajudicial activity poses to the judicial function. That activity may, for
example, deprive judges of the time and energy they need to decide cases
fairly and explain their decisions clearly. Extrajudicial contact with a matter may inhibit the impartial consideration of that matter in the context of
litigation. Similarly, the desire to stay in the graces of, for example, a President who might bestow the favor of an extrajudicial activity might prevent
their considering other matters impartially. Finally, regardless of whether
an extrajudicial activity affects justices' behavior, it may create doubt - an
ambiguity - in the minds of those who must have confidence that judges
will be fair, those without whose confidence the judicial fiat stands in danger of disrespect.
How do the results of Murphy's prodigious research help illuminate
these purported benefits and costs?

III
Adjudication, especially constitutional adjudication, requires judges to
participate in political society in a special way, applying fundamental
norms to resolve controversial fact situations. This experience, building on
judges' pre-judicial experiences, arguably creates a unique political perspective and even political skills that might well be of value to the resolution of matters outside case-or-controversy fora. This view was held much
more widely in the founding period than it is now. Many then agreed with
George Mason, who told the constitutional convention that the judges'
"habit and practice of considering laws in their true principles, and in all
their consequences," laid a strong case that "further use be made of the
Judges, of giving aid in preventing every improper law." 17 In fact, John
Jay's major contribution as Chief Justice was to show the dangers of too
heavy a reliance on "further use" of judges as commission members and
presidential advisers. 18
17. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78 (rev. ed.
1937). The convention of course rejected the specific objective that Mason was advocating,
viz., a Council of Revision, with judicial membership.
18. Wheeler, Extrajudicia/ Activities ofthe Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP. CT. REV, 123.
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The basic notion of judges' obligation to render extrajudicial service has
persisted, however, and it may help explain - Murphy makes clear it
would hardly explain fully (pp. 304-08ff.) - why Frankfurter defended
Jackson's service as special prosecutor at Nuremberg. Frankfurter, despite
his public stance that Justices should not "tak[e] on other jobs," assured
Jackson, not only of "the profound importance" of his mission, but that he
"would discharge the task according to the finest professional standards
both intellectually and ethically" (p. 306). One of Jackson's colleagues at
Nuremberg states the position in a more blunt, if self-serving, fashion:
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge John Parker proclaimed that Jackson's mission was justified because there are occasionally calls "for a judge
to do something for his country which no one but a judge can do so well." 19
Murphy, in fact, notes that Frankfurter succeeded in his extrajudicial tasks
in part because, as a Justice, he was a "free agent. . . . While nearly everyone in Washington could be suspect of jockeying for a position and status,
special attention would be paid to that 'impartial observer, Felix,' who had
already reached the pinnacle of his career ambitions" (p. 189).
Obviously the degree to which judges can contribute extrajudicially as
judges will vary with the task at hand and with the judge performing it. A
desire to grace an important mission with an ornament of impartiality is not
enough to justify involving judges in the task. For example, having justices
serve on the commission to resolve the disputed presidential election of
1876 appears, in retrospect, to have been a poor idea. Given the venality of
the age, and the Court's still-incomplete recuperation from the .Dred Scott
wound, it was unlikely that the justices' service could have helped resolve
challenged election results at the end of the Reconstruction Era. The problem is captured in a Southern newspaper's editorial hope that "if Justice
Bradley could withstand the party pressure that reached him [to sustain
Reconstruction legislation on the bench], there does not appear to be any
reasonable grounds for supposing that he will succumb to such pressure" on
the commission.20 I have serious doubts, for a contemporary example, that
the Supreme Court Justices should be directed to set congressional salaries,
despite the assertions by two members of the Senate leadership in 1982 that
a constitutional amendment to that end would be "the wisest and most
apolitical delegation of such compensation setting authority. . . ." 21
Few, however, would contest the basic assumption behind Canon 4 of
the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct. The canon permits judges to write and lecture on the administration of justice, to appear
before or consult with governmental bodies or officials on matters concerning the administration of justice, and to serve as members or directors of
judicial improvement organizations. In these matters, asserts the commentary, a judge "is in a unique position to contribute," and it encourages
judges to do so as the~ time permits.22 Procedural rule-making benefits
19. Parker, The Judicial Office in the United States, 23 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225, 237 (1948).
20. C. WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION 154 (1951) (quoting the Louisville CourrierJoumal, Jan. 22, 1877).
21. See proposed S.J. Res. 164, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 128 CONG. REC. S. 2022 (Mar. 11,
1982), and statements by Senators Stevens and Baker, id at 2022-23.
22. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4, & commentary, at 18-19 (1972).
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from their involvement.23 Their advice on jurisdictional matters, for which
Alexander Bickel claimed they are "uniquely expert,"24 is similarly beneficial. And much of the work that Brandeis and Frankfurter, along with colleagues and students, did during the 1920s involved the development of
arguments for changes in federal jurisdiction, including the research that
was eventually published as The Business ofthe Supreme Court 25 (pp. 84ff.).
Even though judges are hardly infallible in shaping judicial administration
policies, and although they certainly do not reflect all the perspectives that
need to be brought to bear on the process, surely they should be heard.
Turning to a slightly different category, Murphy devotes most of a chapter to Frankfurter's efforts to promote the judicial candidacies of certain
individuals he thought particularly well qualified for the federal bench and
to derail those of others (pp. 313-38; Brandeis also attempted to influence
appointments, pp. 48-49). Frankfurter had developed a particular view of
criteria that should - and that should not - govern judicial selection (pp.
316-17); it would be surprising to find a judge who has not. Judges know,
in a way that others cannot, what the judicial office entails, what qualities it
needs most, and what kinds of individuals would be appropriate for it.
"Merit selection" commissions for state judicial nominations often include
judges as members. In Missouri, where the system has been most rigorously probed, Watson and Downing report that of the commissioners, "the
judges . . . have evidenced the greatest variety of perspectives on judicial
selection."26 They bring the lawyer's knowledge to the task, but without
attendant bar rivalries, and they surely have a special insight into what the
job of judging entails. As with judicial administration innovations, sitting
judges' perspectives on judicial selection are limited and hardly apolitical,
and there are risks, described below, to their involvement. But there are
benefits as well.
Judicial-related attributes aside, individuals who manage to get appointed to the bench, especially the highest bench in the land, presumably
bring to their chambers more than legal experience and perspective. Almost by definition, they have been actively involved in the affairs of the
day. Forbidding all extrajudicial service would, by definition, deprive the
nation of the benefits of those personal attributes.
Forbidding extrajudicial activity is, in a sense, at odds with the democratic notion that political society benefits from the participation of its
23. See the discussion, and the literature cited therein, in W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES (Federal Judicial Center 1981).
24. Nonjudicial Activities ofSupreme Court Justices and Other Federal Judges: Hearings on
S. 1097 and S. 2109 Before the Subcomm. on Separation ofPowers ofthe Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., Isl Sess. 138 (1969) (statement of Alexander Bickel, Chancellor Kent
Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale University) [hereinafter cited as Nonjudicial Activi•
ties Hearings].
25. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928).
26. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR 337-38
(1969). The United States Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities
has accepted "the premise that, as [federal] judicial selection processes become more institutionalized and with wider participation, judges have a responsibility [when asked specifically
or by a general call for information] to communicate their recommendations and evaluations
to the appointive authorities - the President and Senators - and their selection committees
or commissions." Advisory Opinion No. 59, Apr. 16, 1979.
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members. Justice Douglas once expressed something of this view. In 1939,
the Supreme Court decided O'Malley v. Woodrough, 27 upholding the constitutionality oflegislation subjecting federal judges to the income tax. "As
I entered my vote in the docket book," Douglas claimed, "I decided that I
had just voted myself first-class citizenship. . . . Since I would be paying
as heavy an income tax as my neighbor, I decided to participate in local,
state, and national affairs, except and unless a particular issue was likely to
get into the Court, and unless the activity was plainly political or partisan."28 Douglas's assertion of cause and effect is somewhat disingenuous:
even without O'Malley, one suspects, he would have decided to "register
and vote; . . . fight to raise the level of the [Yakima] public schools [and]
become immersed in conservation, opposing river pollution, advocating
wildlife protection, and the like . . . [and] travel and speak out on foreign
affairs."29
Murphy makes a relatively compelling case that Brandeis' forceful efforts helped to move the New Deal away from the corporate-state mentality
that it exhibited in its early years (pp. 185, 343 & passim). He documents
that Frankfurter, while on the Court, played an important role in the establishment of various foreign policy efforts of the Roosevelt Administration
that broke the isolationist hold dominant in the late 1930s and the early
1940s (pp. 227,282,302 &passim).
To say that we have no assurance that justices' activities off the bench
will produce "contributions" is to miss the point entirely. We would not
think of requiring such assurances before sanctioning the political activities
of any nonjudge. Brandeis' role in turning the direction of the New Deal,
or Frankfurter's in affecting American foreign policy, would not have unanimously been labelled "contributions" at the time, nor would they today.
The test of the propriety of their action is not the degree of approval on the
merits, but the costs, if any, to the Court - and to the system of justice
generally - of Supreme Court justices' acting extrajudicially.
Finally, it may be that extrajudicial activity can also work to the advantage of the judicial process itself. Justice Douglas offered a stronger reason
for exercising his "first-class citizenship" than his status as a taxpayer, a
reason captured in his rather cavalier assertion that a "man or woman who
becomes a Justice should try to stay alive; a lifetime diet of the law alone
turns most judges into dull, dry husks." 30
Justice Rehnquist treated a tangential aspect of this question in explaining his refusal to disqualify himself from the Court's reconsideration of
Laird v. Tatum 31 because of his involvement as an executive department
official in matters before the court. Apart from his specific involvement
with the matter was the contention, as he summarized it, ''that I should
disqualify myself because I have previously expressed in public an understanding of the law and the question of the constitutionality ofgovernmen27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

307 U.S. 277 (1939).
W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 466 (1974).

Id.

Id. at 469.
409 U.S. 824 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.).
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tal surveillance." Rehnquist's response serves as a reminder that justices of
the Supreme Court are drawn from the legal political community in part
because they are among its more prominent members. He noted numerous
justices who, before they went on the bench, played roles in matters that
presented themselves to the Court in the case-or-controversy context, and
reasoned that it
would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if they had not at least
given opinions as to constitutional issues in their previous legal careers.
Proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of
lack of qualification, not lack of bias.32
The question remains whether certain kinds of extrajudicial activities might
similarly enhance a justice's work on the Court. Judging in a democracy is
a vital process, and the nation has some interest in knowing that its judges
are not permanently cut off from the juices that flow through society.
Moreover, it may be that justices see the opportunity for such involvement
as an advantage. The reaction of one of Brandeis' law clerks, J. Willard
Hurst, to Murphy's book is instructive: "The Supreme Court deals with
matters of important public policy," and thus, he said, "[y]ou want people
sophisticated in the affairs of the country, not the naive or simple-minded.
• • ."33 To seek extrajudicial outlets may be a natural inclination of the
kind of people appointed to the Court. The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection certainly leaves the suspicion that both justices may have seriously reconsidered joining the Court if all extrajudicial involvement could,
somehow, have been proscribed: They would have been different persons,
at least, frustrated by the proscription. Would the nation have benefited
from either of those possibilities? This is, to me, the kind of realistic thinking that Schlesinger says the book promotes34 and that serves us well even if
it puzzles us. The puzzlement is captured in Murphy's simple conclusion
that both men "found it impossible to curb their political zeal after their
appointments to the bench" (p. 9). Is it realism or irresponsibility to accept
that inability in some justices? "Perhaps it is time," Murphy suggests, "that
we question more realistically what we can and cannot expect from those
who sit on our highest Court" (p. 8).
IV

In O'Malley, the case that Justice Douglas claimed liberated him for a
life beyond the purple curtain, Justice Frankfurter wrote that judges' "particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing
with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose
Constitution and laws they are charged with administering." 35 Judges do
have a "particular function in government," which takes precedence over
any other function. The benefits that extrajudicial activities may bring to
32.
33.
col. I.
34.
35.

409 U.S. at 835.
Margolick, 2 Justices' Friends Back Secret Role, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1982, § I, at 27,
See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277,282 (1939).
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American political life must be weighed against the burdens those activities
may impose on that "particular function."
Weighing those burdens, to be sure, requires a profound judgment. It
also requires, much more than commentators have been willing to acknowledge, answers to basically empirical questions, ie., questions of fact that
can, in principle at least, be proved wrong. We are short on facts and long
on suspicions about the consequences of extrajudicial activities.
The facts needed to inform our judgment are of various types. Some
can come only from the judges and those who work directly with them. For
example, what is the impact of extrajudicial activity on judges' time demands and work habits? Although there have been some efforts to measure
how judges spend their time, there has been no focus on extrajudicial activities' impact on their judicial work and such a focus would surely be seriously blurred.36 Our sense of the costs that discrete extrajudicial activities
may extract is likely to derive largely from specific examples. Chief Justice
Warren, for instance, insisted that he would not give up his judicial duties
during the investigation of the Kennedy assassination. After he left office,
he told a television interviewer that he "would run back and forth between
[the Court and the commission offices across the street]. I don't believe I
left my work before midnight any night for ten months." 37 What the impact of the extra burden was on his Supreme Court activities one can only
surmise.
Murphy provides a more revealing example. Although Brandeis' extrajudicial work evidently had no effect on his Court workload (pp. 53, 54),
Frankfurter's did. During Frankfurter's pre- and early-World War II involvement in all manner of foreign policy matters, his rate of opinion production did not decline. Murphy, however, concludes from interviews with
Frankfurter clerks that he delegated a larger share of his judicial work to
his law clerks during the period from 1941 to 1943 than he did before or
after it. Save for those years, Frankfurter himself prepared the initial drafts
of his judicial opinions. From 1941 to 1943, however, his law clerk did so
in every case but one (pp. 273-75). Although any difference in the final
product has evidently eluded observers of the Court, the shift in work patterns was arguably an abdication of judicial responsibility to pursue ~xtra36. I am aware of only one serious effort, to calculate how justices allocate their time. See
Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959). It involved, by
the author's admission, "guesswork in part," id at 84, and, more than that, estimates expressed
in averages, which say little about the capacity of nonfungible justices to allocate their time. In
any event, Hart's concern was not the amount of time drained away by extrajudicial activities.
An analysis in 1972 of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revealed that
40 percent of the judges' time was devoted to matters unrelated to cases - mainly court administration activity. The study could not say - it would have been imprudent to ask - what
amount of time went to the full range of extrajudicial activities. See Federal Judicial Center,A
Summary of the Third Circuit Time Study (Federal Judicial Center 1974).
37. Transcript of "A Conversation with Earl Warren,'' in Brandeis /University/ Television
Recollections, taped May 3, 1972, WGBH, Boston, p. 21, quoted with permission of Dr. Abram
L. Sachar.
Justice Hughes' arbitration of the Guatemala-Honduras boundary dispute, although successful, led him to counsel against similar assignments to justices because of "the draft upon
time and energies." THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 167 (D.
Danelski & J. Tulchin eds. 1973).
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judicial goals. But what of the benefits - if that is what they were - that
the arrangement allowed, especially since, if Murphy is to be believed,
Frankfurter may have influenced some important events in ways in which
others could not?
A judge's judicial administration work - in which the judicial perspective is essential but not sufficient - presents this matter of costs and benefits in sharper contrast. We accept as elementary the normative proposition
that each judge should dispose of the cases before him or her as fairly,
quickly, and economically as possible. Such case disposition may not be
achievable simply if each judge tries hard to do so. The administrative and
organizational arts - securing resources, devising procedures, promoting
cooperation, and assessing what works - are necessary to the objective,
surely, in any large court system, and judges must perform them. The administration of justice is a systemic need that may deserve a judge's time at
the expense of prompt attention to an individual case or set of cases.
Perhaps the most frequently asserted cost of judges' extrajudicial activity is bias - the inability to do justice because an extrajudicial contact creates a partiality to one side that affects the judge's decision. What of it
when judges are asked to decide questions on the bench that bear a relatively distinct relationship to matters that they touched off the bench, perhaps in a lecture, perhaps in an informal consultation with a government
official? Brandeis, Murphy shows, participated in cases that presented
questions he had tried to influence off the bench, but he voted in a manner
that one would not predict if extrajudicial lobbying foretold judicial behavior. In 1921, "[b]y voting with the Court against the [Lever Food Control]
act, after having privately told [Food Administrator] Herbert Hoover how
to get it enacted, Brandeis seemingly demonstrated . . . the separation that
existed between his judicial and political roles" (p. 55). Another example is
United States v. But/er,38 which declared the Agricultural Adjustment Act
unconstitutional. As Murphy says, "[d]espite all his [extrajudicial] admonitions and warnings that he would help dismantle the AAA from the high
bench, Brandeis, in dissent, voted to uphold the constitutionality of the act"
(p.142).
The late Alexander Bickel took up a related aspect of this question during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings in the wake of the Fortas affair:
[A] judge is supposed to have an open mind, or at least a mind reachable
by reasoned briefs and arguments. If he goes on public record concerning
issues that are likely to come before him in his judicial capacity, he thereby
at least appears to close his mind, to make himself less reachable by reasoned briefs and arguments. And in some measure every man who goes on
record in this fashion does in fact close his mind. 39
Here we have some clear questions about how human beings behave. Was
Bickel right, for example, in the basic message of his hyperbolic assertion
that "[n]othing is more persuasive to ourselves than our own published
prose"? 40
Answers to that question have been consistently intuitive, perhaps re38. 297 U.S. I (1936).
39. Nonjudicial Activities Hearings, supra note 24, at 142.
40. Id..
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fleeting larger policy objectives. English judges in the eighteenth century
justified their practice of giving advisory opinions with the claim that they
could change their minds "without difficulty"41 if arguments at bar showed
an earlier advisory opinion to be in error. Vermont Congressman Israel
Smith told his colleagues in 1802 that "nothing gives [a judge] greater pleasure than to have it in his power to correct an error, which he may discover
in a former opinion."42 Smith, though, was arguing for abolition of the
separate circuit courts created by the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801,43 one
effect of which would be to restore the justices' dual service as circuit
judges. The justices themselves, however, had never wanted the onerous
burden of traveling about the circuits. Ten years earlier, in making their
case, they told Congress that
appointing the same men finally to correct in one capacity the errors which
they themselves may have committed in another, is a distinction unfriendly
to impartial justice, and to that confidence in the Supreme Court which it is
so essential to the public interest should be reposed in it.44
Justice Blair put the question when the Court reviewed one of the circuit's
decisions. He recused himself but announced that he held "the impressions
which my mind first received," adding parenthetically, however, that he did
not know if those impressions persisted "whether through the force of truth,
or from the difficulty of changing opinions, once deliberately formed." 45
It takes nothing from the eloquence of the phrasing - nor the sincerity
of the writers - to observe that the debate has not come very far in almost
200 years. Is our knowledge - not suspicion, but knowledge - about the
factors that may create extrajudical bias much more today than it was in the
eighteenth century?
The ways in which extrajudicial activity might warp a judge or justice
are varied. Impartial decisionmaking might be frustrated by prior contact
with an issue off the bench, or perhaps by a justice's desire to please those in
a position to award opportunities for extrajudicial service. In fact, the major objection to the first serious instance of a justice's extrajudicial service
- Jay's serving as ambassador to Great Britain - was not that he would be
unable to decide cases fairly because of any diplomatic contacts with litigated issues. Rather it was that justices would decide cases as the President
wished in order to earn prestigious extrajudicial appointments.46 The same
thought shows itself in Frankfurter's opposition to judges who run for office
from the bench, namely Douglas. Douglas's votes on cases, Frankfurter
41. Sackville's Case, 2 Edens Ch. 371-72 (1760).
42. 7 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 706 (1802). Federalist James Bayard saw it differently: To
assume a justice would not "be gratified" by an affirmance of an earlier decision "is estimating
the strength and purity of human nature upon a possible, but not on its ordinary scale." 7
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 618.
43. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (1801).
44. Letter of the Justices to the Congress, Nov. 7, 1792, reprinted in l AMERICAN STATE
PAPERS 52.
45. Penhallow v. Duane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 54, 109 (1795).
46. A Jeffersonian paper complained that it was necessary that Jay be in the country were
he needed to preside over any impeachment proceedings, but also "that he should be above the
bias which the honor and emoluments in the gift of the executive might create, . . ." Aurora
General Advertiser (Philadelphia), May 10, 1794.
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feared, were determined by "whether they might help or hurt his chances
for the presidency." He was " 'writing for a different constituency' " (p.
267).
Others might respond that these are meaningless questions, because regardless of whether justices actually become tainted, the citizenry will perceive the judges as biased, and the Court will lose the public support
essential to acceptance of its decisions. Murphy stresses the importance of
pubic opinion, but he writes as if the public has the same level of
knowledge of the justices' work (and of sources such as his book, p. 151) as
do those who follow the Court closely. He asserts, for an example, that in
the early twentieth century, "a forgiving public [had] recently acquiesced
for the first time in over forty years to a close advisory relationship between
a Supreme Court justice (William Moody) and a president (Theodore
Roosevelt)" (p. 17). The evidence suggests, though, that the public knows
little of what the justices do on the bench,47 and it is likely that they know
less of extrajudicial activities, even when publicly reported. There certainly
appears to be little basis for Murphy's apparent speculation that, although
President Nixon's forced resignation had little long-term effect on the prestige of the presidential office, efforts to bar Fortas, Douglas, or Haynsworth,
from the Court "may permanently lessen public confidence in the Court
itself, and hence compromise the ability of the entire judicial branch to
have its decisions accepted as law" (p. 14).48
Even if John Q. Citizen is unaware of what the justices do - on or off
the bench - the Court does have a constituency of those who follow public
events, and, more particularly, various segments of the legal community.
47. The visibility of the Supreme Court is not easy to measure, but probably it is lower
than might be inferred from popular opinion polls that appear in the press - based on forcedchoice responses to questions about which people may in fact have no information. Walter
Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus set about the task of measuring the Court's visibility in the
1960s, and found that, in 1964 and in 1966, less than half their respondents even attempted to
answer an open-ended question seeking to learn what "the Supreme Court in Washington has
done that you have disliked . . . liked . . . ?" Murphy & Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and 1/1e
United Stales Supreme Court, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 273, 276-77 (J. Grossman
& J. Tanenhaus eds. 1969). To a question about the Supreme Court's constitutional role, less
than 40 percent could give answers that could be coded according to one of ten broad functions -e.g., "interpret the Constitution," or "settle basic questions." Furthermore, this survey
was conducted in a period of heightened and presumably visible Supreme Court activity. On
the other hand, as Murphy and Tanenhaus note, open-ended questions may underestimate
visibility because people have difficulty remembering what they do know. Moreover, visibility
increased with education. Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra, at 276-86.
Nevertheless, given these measures of visibility of the Court's basic functions, one can wonder how visible to the public are a justice's speech, lecture, or visit with the president.
48. In listing the problems encountered by Fortas, Haynsworth, and Douglas, Murphy also
cites "the frequent criticism of' Chief Justice Burger, but I am unaware of any serious claim
that he should not be on the Court and thus do not include him among those about whom such
claims were made.
As to Murphy's worries: In 1975 Murphy and Tanenhaus resurveyed those in the original
study, see note 47 supra, who had displayed some knowledge of the Court. Although their
object was obviously not to test Bruce Murphy's statement about the effects of questionable
extrajudicial activity on support for the Court, their conclusion is revealing: "In the aggregate,
diffuse support [i.e., general trust or confidence) for the Supreme Court, despite tremors that
shook the entire political system, proved comfortingly resilient." Tanenhaus & Murphy, Patterns ofPublic Support far the Supreme Court: A Panel Study, 43 J. POL, 24, 29 (1981).
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That constituency's attitude toward the Court probably influences the
Court's effectiveness, by setting a climate of trust, or distrust, regarding the
Court's ability to reach its decisions free from the pressure of improper influence. A controversial matter off the bench - regardless of whether it
affects judicial performance - creates an ambiguity, a doubt, that a justice
can have a partisan position on one issue (in, for example, a speech off the
bench) but maintain a dispassionate, neutral position on the bench on another issue. This doubt is possible even if the two sets of issues are completely distinct for the judge, and probable if they are not. .
Although Brandeis voted to sustain the Agricultural Adjustment Act after lobbying against it (p. 142), he may have committed a serious error just
the same, simply by threatening a judicial rebuke to the Act. He failed "to
observe the most basic stricture for the judiciary, that against using the
power of judicial office to further political goals" (p. 141). And, as Murphy
wisely observes, Brandeis' action may have led the officials with whom he
consulted to believe that they had persuaded a justice how to vote in a case
(p. 142). What would be the effect, for another example, on trust in the
Court if it were known that one of its members was lobbying actively for
the appointment of certain individuals to the bench? There is presumably a
limit to how much of this kind of ambiguity the Court's constituency will
tolerate before it begins to discount the authority of the judicial fiat.
The implications of this speculation, however, tend to becloud what the
speculation is about, viz., empirical questions. How, in fact, does extrajudicial activity affect judges' work on the bench - their ability to decide cases
without prejudice - or public confidence in the Court? I do not pretend
that we have the methodological tools to answer those questions, but I think
we would elevate the debate if we recognized the kinds of questions they
are. Murphy's contribution to the debate, however, is significant. He has
provided much grist for the mill.

